Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals I-II, decoded

First Section

The only good thing is a good will. Intelligence, wit, courage and wealth can be abused. A good will cannot be abused. A good will shines like a jewel, even if bad luck leads it to bad effects.

Many people take joy in being kind to others. I maintain that actions like this are done for selfish reasons. They are not good at all. If people act to make themselves happy, they are being selfish; that they are volunteering, or helping an old woman across the street should not make their actions more noble than any other selfish action.

We should not love our neighbours because it makes everyone happy. We should not avoid coveting our neighbour’s wife because it keeps the peace. We should do these things because they are the right thing to do.

An action is good if it is done according the right maxim. That means an action is good if it is done for the right reason—if it is done with a good will. Instead of focussing on the consequences of our actions, we should focus on the reasons we act. I call these reasons, ‘maxims’. Good actions are those that are done with good intentions, good maxims, a good will, or out of duty. All of these mean the same thing.

Many people act out of respect for the laws made by politicians and enforced by police. These are not the real laws of morality, though they may be a rough guide to what good laws are.

What, then, are the real laws? First, a real law must determine my duty. It must make clear the underlying reason for my actions. Second, a real law obviously cannot depend on who I am. Laws apply to everyone. That is what makes them laws. Finally, a good law cannot depend on the effects of my actions. What, then, are the real laws? There is only one: I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.

This means, in short, that there is one law that makes all the others. The one law is this: Act according to the law. In other words, do unto others as you would have them do unto everyone else.

Imagine that a man wanted to borrow money and to not repay it. His maxim would be “False promises are acceptable”. If we put this to the test, we imagine applying this maxim to everyone. Can everyone make a false promise? No. If everyone made false promises, promises would be worthless, so a promise would not be a promise. This is a contradiction.

Notice that we do not forbid him to borrow money because it leads to bad consequences. That is irrelevant. Even if it made everyone happy to steal, stealing would be wrong. In fact, even if it made everyone happier all of the time to follow the maxim “False promises are acceptable”, doing so would be wrong. The rule contradicts itself, so it cannot be a rule. Notice, too, that this rule did determine the would-be thief’s duty, did not depend on his particular circumstances, and was not determined by its consequences—the conditions we said it must fulfill.

Second Section

All moral conceptions must be like this. They must come only from within. They must, in other words, be completely a priori. If they were not a priori, they would come from abstraction from circumstances in the world, and when those circumstances changed, so too would the laws.

The process of going from a law to an ‘ought’ is making ‘imperatives’. Imperatives are these commands of reason. Because they come from universal laws, imperatives are objective. They do not depend on who you are, and everyone will agree to them. However, sometimes our wills are weak, and sometimes we choose how to act out of selfishness instead of doing what is rational. Nonetheless, it is clear what should have been done.

There are two kinds of imperatives: categorical and hypothetical. Hypothetical imperatives are of this kind: if x then y. X is the goal. Y is the step to take. If you want a good job, go to school is an example of a hypothetical imperative.

Categorical imperatives are harder to explain. Categorical imperatives are ‘good in themselves’. They are the commands of the will according to reason, which in turn is in accordance with the universal and objective laws. “Be good to your mother” is a categorical imperative. There’s something disgusting about saying “If you want a cookie, be good to your mother”. Everyone should always be good to their mothers. It is categorical.

If we could figure out exactly what would make us all happy, and if we could find the precise path to happiness, then we could create perfect hypothetical imperatives to follow. When we try to do this, it is rather like the genie and the three wishes: wish for riches and you can have them, but the price will be the envy of your friends and the loss of your loves; wish for a long life, and you could live a long life of misery. It follows that these hypothetical imperatives cannot really command action at all. We can see the goal, but we can’t decide which path will take us there. We need categorical imperatives instead.

A categorical imperative applies to everyone. It cannot be contradicted. Otherwise, of course, it would not be categorical and it would not be imperative. There is, therefore, only one categorical imperative: Do unto others as you would have them do unto everyone else.

All duties can be derived from this law. Here are a few:

1. A man would like to kill himself because his life is miserable. His maxim is this: “I should kill myself when life is more unpleasant than pleasant”. This cannot be a law of nature, though. Pleasantness stimulates life. It cannot both stimulate and destroy life. That is a contradiction.
2. A man would like to borrow money and not repay it. His maxim will be: I can break promises. This cannot be a universal law: a promise from him would not be a promise. That is a contradiction.
3. A woman would like to play Nintendo instead of being a contributing member of society. Her maxim: I will neglect my natural gifts. This cannot happen because a rational being wills that her gifts are developed.
4. A rich man does not want to give to charity. His maxim: let everyone keep what they make and do the best they can. But this cannot be a universal law, because if he were poor, he would want someone to help him.

Some actions cannot be thought of as universal laws without leading to contradictions. In contrast, sometimes we want an exception from the universal law. We want to get away with something we know is wrong. Then there is a contradiction in our own wills: we want the law, but do not want it for ourselves.

All rational things are ends-in-themselves, and should not be used as means or stepping stones to some other goal. Irrational beings have value only as means. That is why they are called ‘things’. Rational beings have absolute worth. That is why they are not things, but are human beings. Things have prices, ends do not have prices.

Every person thinks of herself as an end and worthy of respect. Every other rational being thinks the same thing of herself. This, then, is an objective principle, just like the categorical imperative. Accordingly the practical imperative will be: Treat everyone as an end, never as a means.

If we look back on other ethical philosophies, it is easy to see why they failed. They all held that people were bound by laws. They did not see that the only laws that people are bound by are those they make for themselves. A person can be compelled to act in a certain way, but she cannot be compelled to will a certain way. She might be made do things that lead to good consequences, but she cannot be made to want the right things to happen. Therefore, nobody can be made to truly follow the law. Every person must choose to follow the laws.

Every person must be her own lawmaker. This may sound like everyone will choose to make and follow laws that lead to her own advantage. But, as I said, the laws are derived from the categorical imperative, and so they will be objective. In other words, everyone must, due to logic, agree on the laws. All rational beings must agree that they must treat themselves and everyone else as ends-in-themselves. This results in a systematic union of common, objective laws. It results in what I call “a kingdom of ends”. Of course it is only an ideal.

Still, when a person is a member of the kingdom of ends, she gives laws, and she is subject to them at the same time. She is a ruler who chooses to be a subject … subject to the rules. This is what freedom of will allows. Freedom of will lets us be lawmakers and law-followers at the same time.